Key Arguments
- 1.The "engagement" era (1979-2017) rested on assumptions about Chinese liberalization that did not materialize
- 2.Both parties in Washington now agree on a more competitive posture, but disagree on tactics
- 3.Pure decoupling is neither achievable nor desirable; "de-risking" represents the emerging consensus
The End of the Engagement Era
For nearly four decades, US policy toward China rested on a core premise: that integrating China into the global economy would lead to political liberalization, a rules-based international order embraced by Beijing, and a relationship that, while competitive in some areas, would be fundamentally cooperative.
That consensus has shattered. Across the American political spectrum, there is now agreement that engagement did not produce the expected results. China has become more authoritarian under Xi Jinping, more assertive in its region, and a more formidable technological competitor. The question is no longer whether to change course, but how.
What Engagement Achieved—and Didn't
A fair assessment of the engagement era must acknowledge both its successes and failures:
Successes
- • Lifted hundreds of millions from poverty
- • Created massive economic interdependence
- • Avoided military conflict between great powers
- • Enabled cooperation on some global issues
Failures
- • No political liberalization occurred
- • Technology transfer enabled military modernization
- • WTO membership didn't create a "market economy"
- • Created dependencies now seen as vulnerabilities
The New Consensus—and Its Limits
The Trump administration initiated a dramatic shift with tariffs, technology restrictions, and confrontational rhetoric. The Biden administration has largely maintained and extended these policies while adding multilateral dimensions. The bipartisan consensus on China as a strategic competitor is real.
But this consensus masks significant disagreements about means. Hawks favor comprehensive decoupling; moderates prefer targeted "de-risking." Some prioritize military deterrence; others emphasize economic and technological competition. Alliance-builders focus on coordinating with partners; unilateralists prefer American action.
"Washington agrees that engagement failed. It does not agree on what should replace it. The result is policy that zigzags between confrontation and pragmatism."
De-Risking: The Emerging Framework
"De-risking" has emerged as the preferred framing in both Washington and European capitals. The concept acknowledges that full decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable, but maintains that certain dependencies pose unacceptable risks:
- •Technology supply chains critical to national security (semiconductors, rare earths)
- •Technologies with dual-use military applications (AI, quantum)
- •Critical infrastructure (telecom, energy)
- •Data and information flows that could enable surveillance or influence
Outside these narrow areas, the framework accepts continued economic integration and seeks to avoid triggering a broader spiral of protectionism.